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Abstract
There are still problems in handling diversity in economics.
The general equilibrium model itself lacks determinacy for a generic
population of economic agents. In an outstanding contribution,
Jean-Michel Grandmont (1992) argues that increasing behavioural
heterogeneity makes aggregate expenditures more independent of
prices. He conjectures that, in the aggregate, weak axiom of re-
vealed preference, gross substitutability, uniqueness and stability
of the Walrassian exchange equilibrium would prevail under \°at
enough" distributions of characteristics. This note emphasises
the speciflc nature of the distributions involved in Grandmont’s
framework and enhances that the strong macroeconomic regular-
ities that he evidences cannot be considered as a general property
of exchange markets.
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1. Introduction1
1.1. The di–culties arising from heterogeneity
Surprisingly enough, economic theory is still not able to deal correctly
with heterogeneity. Handling diversity is nevertheless a central problem
of economics, as it is presumably in all other social sciences. If people are
indeed difierent, they are likely to be afiected difierently by their envi-
ronment and to react difierently facing an identical situation. Two main
questions are thus raised. First, what are the criteria to be used in order
to take a decision that concerns various people? This is the normative
problem. Second, how does an economy that is compounded of difierent
people work? This is the positive problem. Naturally, such a distinction
is usually not possible as both issues are intrinsically connected.
A good example of the problems at hand and a clear outline of the
limits of economic theory in handling diversity is given by the representa-
tive agent approach. Despite its widespread use, the model is, in general,
both unjustifled and misleading. (See A. P. Kirman - 1992). It is un-
justifled because (i) individual optimization does not engender collective
rationality and conversely (ii) the fact that the community exhibits a
certain rationality does not imply that individuals flnd themselves in an
1This paper is a part of my Ph.D. Thesis. It develops a suggestion by Alan Kirman.
I would like to thank Jean-Michel Grandmont for his detailed comments on a ¯rst draft
of this paper and for his kind encouragements. I met Reinhard John at a conference
and he gave me an interesting reference for the interpretation of my results. I was then
invited by Werner Hildenbrand in Bonn where I enjoyed an outstanding environment
for research. No need to say that his deep understanding of the aggregation problem
played a leading role for the present work. Special thanks to Kurt Hildenbrand for an
illuminating example presented in this paper. Herbert Scarf and Rodolphe Dos Santos
Ferreira provided interesting remarks at my thesis defence. I am indebted to David
Cass, Benedetto Gui and Bruno Versaevel for both helpful discussions and editing
help. This work was presented at the \Second International Workshop on Economics
with Heterogeneous and Interacting Agents" at Ancona (It.), the 97' Econometric
Society European Meeting in Toulouse (Fr.), at the \7µeme journ¶ees du SESAME"
-S¶eminaires d'Etudes et de Statistiques Appliqu¶ees µa laMod¶elisation en Economie"
in Lyon (Fr.) and at the departemental seminar of the THEMA (Fr.). All remaining
errors are mine.
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optimal situation from their own point of view. It is misleading because
the reaction of the representative agent to some change may not be the
same as the aggregate reaction of the individuals he is supposed to rep-
resent. Thus the description of the economy is not accurate. Moreover,
even if the choices of the representative agent coincide with aggregate
choices, the representative agent might \prefer" one of two situations
where individuals would prefer the other (See S. C. Dow and S. Werlang
- 1988). In other words the valuation of the various situations can difier
and normative judgement is not possible. Some results derived by M.
Jerison (1993) show that the use of such a representative agent is legit-
imate for welfare interpretations under very narrow conditions that are
not verifled for generic cases.
1.2. Problems in the understanding of competitive markets
As a decentralised process, the free market is argued to overcome the
di–culties that one faces in taking a uniform and centralised decision
regarding a heterogeneous population. In some sense, it escapes the
problems raised by the theory of social choice by leaving each economic
agent to make the necessary decisions. However the properties of the
competitive market as a coordination device are somewhat unclear. De-
spite its early introduction in the literature, the simple existence of an
equilibrium, i.e. the possibility of consistent decisions across several indi-
viduals, was only proved in full generality by K. J. Arrow and G. Debreu
in the 50’s. But there are no results with respect to the uniqueness and
stability of this equilibrium. Thus the general equilibrium model, often
considered as the benchmark of neoclassical economics, does not allow of
deflnite conclusions because of its lack of determinacy.
1.3. The flasco of the micro-foundations project
While a normative approach to the problem of heterogeneity does not
conceal its intrinsic di–culties \from the beginning", the idea that ex-
planations of social phenomena must be based on individuals has enjoyed
a long life. It is already to be found in W. S. Jevons (1871) who a–rmed
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that \the general forms of the laws of economics are the same in the case
of individuals and the nations." 2. J. S. Mill (1874) made the following
observation:
Human beings in society have no properties but those which
are derived from, and may be resolved into, the laws of nature
in the individual man. In social phenomena the Composition
of Causes is the universal law.3
More recently, J. R. Hicks (1939) even asserted that \the behaviour
of a group of individuals or a group of flrms obeys the same laws as the
behaviour of a single unit." 4
However the problem is not that simple. On the contrary, in the
words of K. J. Arrow (1968), \a limit is set to the tendency implicit in
price theory, particularly in its mathematical versions, to deduce all prop-
erties of aggregate behaviour from assumptions about individual economic
agents." 5
Since the \negative" results of H. Sonnenschein (1972, 1973), R.
Mantel (1974, 1976, 1977) and G. Debreu (1974), it has been well known
that no satisfactory theory links the characteristics of economic agents
identifled by microeconomic theory and the properties of aggregated sys-
tems used in macroeconomic theory : Even with \strong individualistic
assumptions",6 the only restrictions imposed on aggregate demand func-
tions are the continuity for all strictly positive prices, the homogeneity of
2W.S. Jevons, (1871), \The Theory of Political Economy", A.M. Kelley, New York,
(1965), p.16. Reference from Rizvi (1994).
3Mill, J. S. (1875), \A system of logic", in Robson, J. M., (1974), \Collected works
of John Stuart Mill", Toronto, p.879. Reference from Rizvi (1994).
4Hicks, J.R. (1939), \Value and Capital: an Inquiry into some Fundamental Prin-
ciples of Economic Theory", Clarendon Press, Oxford, p.245. Reference from Rizvi
(1994).
5Arrow, K. J., (1968), \Economic Equilibrium", in \International Encyclopedia
of the Social Sciences", vol 4, pp.376-89, Mac Milan, London. Reference from Rizvi
(1994).
6i.e. preferences are assumed to be continuous, convex and to give rise to a mono-
tone preorder.
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degree 0 in prices and the fact that Walras’ law is verifled. (For a review
of the microfoundations project, see S. Abu Turab Rizvi (1994)).
In economics, there is no hope of ever explaining social objects by realistic
assumptions on individuals exclusively.
As a consequence, almost any macroeconomic feature can be ex-
plained by the general equilibrium model. The latter provides no indi-
cations as to the nature of market outcomes7. In particular, as already
mentioned, the assumption of uniqueness and stability of the equilib-
rium has no theoretical justiflcation. Accordingly, to refer generically to
a \natural" state of the economy is meaningless. (See A. P. Kirman -
1989).
1.4. The necessity of macroeconomic assumptions
As a result, the competitive market representation must turn to addi-
tional assumptions8 in order to ensure the drawing of unambiguous flg-
ures. In strict microfoundations, macroeconomic regularities are sought
in the individual behaviour of agents, not in the social structure in which
they flnd themselves. (See E. J. Nell- 1984). The failure of the microfoun-
dations project has shown macroeconomics to be somewhat irreducible.
But uniqueness and stability of the equilibrium are required for the de-
terminacy of the analysis.
This is the origin of the gross-substitutability assumption, flrst introduced
by A. Wald in 1936. The latter has the merit of both strong technical
implications and clear economic interpretation. This enables the infer-
ence to be challenged and avoids purely ad hoc assumptions hidden under
technical arguments. While microeconomics happens to be insu–cient
to explain all macroeconomic properties, macroeconomic assumptions
are expected to be at least plausible and should always be submitted
to some consistency examination including compatibility with microeco-
nomic choice theory.
7
Except the \Welfare theorems"
8By additional assumptions, it is meant that assumptions cannot bear on individ-
ual behaviour only but should go beyond strict micro theory.
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1.5. Gross substitutability
What does \gross substitutability" mean? It means that when the price
of one good rises, the excess demand of all other goods increases. It is
nice because it is simple. Furthermore it is su–cient to make general
equilibrium models follow the rules of partial equilibrium models.
The idea that gross substitutability might be assumed is intuitive when
consumption is considered: if two goods are substitutes, then increasing
the price of one would lead to an increase in the demand for the other
one, hence in excess demand. The idea that gross substitutability may
not hold is intuitive when production is considered: if two commodities
are joint-products (complements), then increasing the price of the flrst
would lead producers to increase the production of both, which would
tend to decrease the excess demand for the second. Note that, even in a
pure exchange economy, gross substitutability is not granted. As a result,
the assumption that gross substitutability prevails as the combined re-
sponse of choices by consumers and producers is far from being obvious.
The su–cient conditions imposed on the nature of economic agents’
preferences that would guarantee gross-substitutability are not known.9
However, gross-substitutability, together with the weak axiom of revealed
preference, is a su–cient condition for gross stability (and uniqueness of
the equilibrium). This amply justifles the interest in this assumption and
the conditions that allow such a property to hold.10
9As already mentioned, some work by H. Sonnenschein, R. Mantel and G. Debreu
in the 70's has shown instead that the only properties of the excess demand function
which can be deduced by requiring the economic agents to be well behaved (i.e. pref-
erences are continuous, convex and give rise to a monotone preorder) are Walras'Law,
homogeneity, and continuity (or di®erentiability).
R. Mantel (1976) has shown the result to hold for the (even stronger) assumption of
homothetic preferences.
10Note however that gross-substitutability is not necessary to get the stability of
the general equilibrium.
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1.6. Assumptions on distribution
An innovative approach in trying to flll the gap between micro and macro
was introduced by J.-M. Grandmont (1987) following W. Hildenbrand
(1983) and others. The idea is that instead of introducing some restric-
tions on the form of individual demand (or any micro-variable) or making
unwarranted macro assumptions, \nice" macro-features may result from
aggregation by the means of assumptions made on the distribution of
characteristics among individuals. This conjecture, already formulated
by many like A. Wald, J. R. Hicks, K. J. Arrow and F. H. Hahn, seems
to flnd conflrmation in an article by J.-M. Grandmont (1992). He estab-
lishes under quite mild conditions that \pathological" market features
are unlikely to arise at the aggregate level when there is \enough be-
havioural heterogeneity".
We shall attempt to show that it is too early to draw some deflnite
conclusions. The assumptions of Grandmont’s model are shown to be
more restrictive than they might appear at flrst glance. They are nev-
ertheless necessary. An example is provided in which one (questionable)
assumption is relaxed. In this exchange economy, no distribution of char-
acteristics over the space of vector parameters precludes the aggregate
excess demand function from violating the gross substitutability condi-
tion. The result established by Grandmont is far from being a general
property of exchange markets. We will show that, in the limit and unless
\pathological cases", his parametrization lead in fact the economy to be
exclusively made of \Cobb-Douglas agents".
1.7. Structure of the paper
The paper is organized as follows. In section two, Grandmont’s model
is sketched and some comments on the hypothesis are made. In par-
ticular it is emphasised that the aggregation process is likely to be ill-
designed because some \behavioural types" might be over represented.
First the equivalence classes generated by the transformation introduced
by Grandmont do not always have the same dimension. This intro-
duces some biases in the whole distribution of demand functions. Sec-
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ond, this a–ne transformation on the commodity space does not always
generate an inflnite number of distinguishable equivalence classes. How-
ever, Grandmont introduces a continuous parametrization of the space
of equivalent classes11 that leads necessarily to an over-representation of
some types of consumers in those cases. Thus the smoothing process in
the aggregation can be double: within and in addition over the equiv-
alence classes. As a consequence, while heterogeneity increases within
each equivalence class when the dispersion of parameters increases, it is
not clear that heterogeneity also increases in the overall economy.
The assumption that guarantees aggregate budget shares to be uniformly
bounded away from zero is shown to be quite restrictive. It is not verifled
for very common demand functions, like those generated by CES-utility
functions. In fact this assumption requires all the commodities to be
\essential" for the economy because it should hold for all set of prices.
Moreover it appears to bear upon the (partial) result of the aggregation
itself.
In section three, the assumption that guarantees aggregate budget
shares to be uniformly bounded away from zero is removed in order to
study its importance for Grandmont’s theorem. A set of \behavioural
types" and a (discrete) distribution over it is provided. For any symmet-
ric distribution of parameters over the transformation space, the latter
generates an aggregate excess demand function that violates the gross-
substitutability assumption in this exchange economy. It shows that the
\°atness" of the distribution is not su–cient for guarantee \nice" prop-
erties at the aggregate level.
As one might suspect that this result to come from the fact the we shift
from a continuous and inflnite set of types to a discrete and flnite set12, a
continuous distribution of types is presented that exhibits the same out-
11
Each equivalent class is supposed to represent a \behavioural type".
12See the results of Kirman and Koch (1986) as opposed those of Hildenbrand
(1983). The ¯rst shows that, in a ¯nite economy, Sonnenschein-Debreu-Mantel's re-
sult is valid for essentially any distribution of income in which individuals have iden-
tical preferences; While the second, in an atomless economy, obtains a monotonicity
property for the market demand by restricting the shape of the income distribution
in the consumption sector.
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comes. Finally, the number of equivalence classes present in the economy
is shown to have no clear impact on the aggregate demand function.
In the last section before conclusion, a come back is made to Grand-
mont’s [1992] paper in order to re-interpret the results. It is argued that
the conjunction of the parametrization and the assumption about bud-
get shares imply indirectly very speciflc distributions of demand func-
tions. With the degree of \heterogeneity", this is in fact the number of
\Cobb-Douglas like" demand functions that increases in the economy.
Thus Grandmont’s results might be read as follows: If there is a \su–-
cient number" of \Cobb-Douglas like" demands in the whole population,
then gross-substitutability is guaranteed. In this perspective however,
the aggregation process presented appears to be rather a \Law of large
numbers" that conserve some micro-properties common to \the most"
(demand functions). It is not the heterogeneity of the demand functions
that generates13 some structure at the macro-level and provides the re-
sults.
Finally, a brief conclusion is drawn that questions the directions to
explore for further research. The investigation of how micro-properties of
the demand functions combine in the process of aggregation is certainly a
fascinating program. However, if generic assumptions with respect to the
shape of the distribution of characteristics alone might not be su–cient
to derive general results, there is a question about the adequacy of such
an approach when those characteristics cannot be observed.
13by counterbalancing some agents' reactions to price changes by the opposite re-
action of others.
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2. The Grandmont’s model:
For the analysis to be self-contained, the main hypotheses and results by
J.-M. Grandmont (1992) are reported in the following.
2.1. Outline of the main results
Consider a pure exchange economy with l ‚ 2 commodities. The charac-
teristics of an individual agent are assumed to be described by a demand
function » (p; w) and an income level w.
There is a flrst set A of \types" of agents that is taken to be a separable
metric space, to simplify matters. A distribution over types is then de-
scribed by a probability measure „ on A: To each type a corresponds a
demand function »a (p; w) and an income level wa > 0:
For any vector fi 2 <l deflne the ‘fi-transform’ of a demand function
» (p; w):
» (fi; p; w) = e® › » (e® › p; w)
where › indicates the normal tensorial product: a›b = (a1b1; :::; albl) : A
conditional distribution f (fi j a) on the space <l of indexing parameters
fi is specifled. It describes the distribution of agents over the equivalence
class of type a generated by the fi-transforms.
The overall distribution of characteristics in the economy is thus de-
scribed by the marginal probability measure „ on A and the conditional
densities f (fi j a) on <l: The assumptions of the model are as follows:
Assumption 1. The income level wa > 0 depends continuously on the
type a: Per capita income is flnite i.e.,
„w =
Z
A
wa„ (da) < +1
then total market demand given by
X (p) =
Z
A
X (a; p; wa)„ (da)
9
where X (a; p; wa) =
R
<l
»a (fi; p; w) f (fi j a) dfi; is well deflned, non neg-
ative, continuous in p and satisfles p:X (p) · „w:
Assumption 2.
(1) The demand function »a (p; w) is continuous in (a; p; w) :
(2) The conditional density f (fi j a) is continuous in (fi; a) : It has partial
derivatives (@f=@fik) (fi j a) ; and they are continuous in (fi; a) :Moreover,
for each type a; partial derivatives are uniformly integrable, i.e., for every
k = 1; :::; l
mk (a) =
Z
<l
¯¯
¯¯
¯
@f
@fik
(fi j a)
¯¯
¯¯
¯ dfi < +1:
Assumption 3. For every commodity k; mk (a) is bounded above by
mk for „-almost every type a:
Assumption 4. For „-almost every a; the conditional density f (fi j a)
is independent of a:
Assumption 5. For every commodity h; there exists "h > 0; with
P
h "h •
1; such that for all vectors of positive prices p
ph
Z
A
»ah (p; wa)„ (da) ‚ "h „w:
With these assumptions, Grandmont (1992) proves the following
theorem:
Theorem 2.1. Assume (A1) ; (A2) ; (A3) ; (A4) ; (A5) : Then phXh (p) ‚
"h „w for every h and for every p: The price elasticity of aggregate demand
satisfles ¯
¯
¯
¯
¯
@ lnXh
@ ln pk
(p) + –hk
¯
¯
¯
¯
¯
• mk="h
This implies in particular
1. Total market demand for commodity h is a decreasing function of
its own price, i:e:; (@Xh=@ph) (p) < 0; if mh < "h:
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2. Assume mh < "h for every commodity h and let DD (m; ") be the
set of prices p in Int<l+ such that
P
k (mk=pk) < "h=ph for every
h = 1; :::::; l: Then the Jacobian matrix of total market demand is
such that
@Xh
@ph
(p) < 0;
¯¯
¯¯
¯
@Xh
@ph
(p)
¯¯
¯¯
¯ >
X
k 6=h
¯¯
¯¯
¯
@Xh
@pk
(p)
¯¯
¯¯
¯
for every p in DD (m; ") and has therefore a dominant diagonal on
that set.
3. Assume mk l < "h for all commodities h; k: Then total demand has
a negative quasi-deflnite Jacobian Matrix , i.e.,
P
h;k vh (@Xh=@pk) vk
< 0 for every v = (v1; :::; vl) 6= 0 and every price system p in Int<l+;
and is thus strictly monotone, i.e., (p¡ q) : ([X (p)¡X (q)]) < 0
whenever p 6= q: In particular, the weak axiom of revealed prefer-
ence is satisfled in the aggregate, i.e., p:X (q) • „w; X (q) 6= X (p)
implies q:X (p) > „w
It is demonstrated further on that, in an exchange economy and
under the given assumptions, both the weak axiom of revealed prefer-
ence and the gross-substitutability assumption hold. As a consequence,
the general equilibrium model would exhibit a unique and stable equi-
librium. Therefore, the consequence of Grandmont’s result is that, if
there is \enough behavioural heterogeneity", (i) the competitive market
appears to be an e–cient coordination device, even for an heterogeneous
population and (ii) the general equilibrium model appears to be a sound
tool for policy analysis. By showing the limits of Grandmont’s result, it
is also the universality of such a view that is questioned.
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2.2. Some remarks on the model
2.2.1. What is to be called a type?
A strong point of Grandmont’s article is the fact that his result extends
to a wide range of populations and is not conflned, say, to populations
for which agents’ characteristics are derived from the fi-transforms of a
common (unique) demand function. Such a generality is obtained by
the introduction of the set A of agents’ types. At this point, a natural
question arises as to the nature of a type in this model. In what do types
difier? What is the economic meaning of an equivalence class?
To begin with the analysis, it is worth drawing attention to a rather
technical element. The equivalence class of all fi-transforms of a given
demand function is claimed to be isomorphic to <l by the author. This
is generally true, but not always. If the demand function is proportional
to income and more generally if it has special features with respect to
the fi-transforms, the dimension of the equivalence class is less than l.14
This apparently innocuous point has strong consequences in terms of the
overall distribution of demand functions in the economy, as will be shown
in what follows.
There is nothing remarkable in the assertion that without any speciflca-
tion on the set A; i.e. on the nature of the demand functions, the notion
of type might lack signiflcance. Depending on A; the number of equiv-
alence classes may vary from inflnity to one. Obviously, if the partition
in equivalence classes is reduced to one element,15 the introduction of a
continuous density over A is not an adequate representation and leads to
a double smoothing process in the aggregation process. An illustration
of these points can be found in the following examples.
14
See W. Trockel.
15
This is the case when all the demand functions of the set A can be obtained as
the ®-transform of one another: all demand functions are part of the same (unique)
equivalent class.
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Example 2.1. Let A =
n
a 2 [0; 1]l = P ai = 1
o
and »a (p; w) be the
demand function derived from the maximization of the Cobb-Douglas
utility function Ua =
Q
i x
ai
i :
»a (p; w) is invariant to any fi-transform. Thus the market share of every
commodity is a constant in all equivalence classes. Note however that
the latter are all reduced to a single point.
Example 2.2. Let l = 2; A = ]0; 1[ and assume the demand to be de-
rived from a C.E.S. utility function, say u (x1; x2) =
³
ax¡½1 + (1¡ a) x¡½2
´
¡
1
½
where ‰ = 1¡¾
¾
< 1:
»a1 (p; w) =
a¾p¡¾1 w
a¾p1¡¾1 + (1¡ a)¾ p1¡¾2
»a2 (p; w) =
(1¡ a)¾ p¡¾2 w
a¾p1¡¾1 + (1¡ a)¾ p1¡¾2
The fi-transform is given by the formula:
»a1 (fi; p; w) =
e®1(1¡¾)a¾p¡¾1 w
e®1(1¡¾)a¾p1¡¾1 + e
®2(1¡¾) (1¡ a)¾ p1¡¾2
»a2 (fi; p; w) =
e®2(1¡¾) (1¡ a)¾ p¡¾1 w
e®1(1¡¾)a¾p1¡¾1 + e
®2(1¡¾) (1¡ a)¾ p1¡¾2
and all the types belong to the same equivalence class.
»a (fi; p; w) = »a0 (fi
0; p; w)
where fi0 is obtained by a simple translation in <2:
fi01 = fi1 ¡
1
‰
ln
Ã
a0
a
!
fi0
2
= fi2 ¡ 1
‰
ln
Ã
1¡ a0
1¡ a
!
Now, in the words of Grandmont, \if the conditional densities f (fi j a) are
\°at", they are \close" to being invariant by an arbitrary translation."
13
Thus, as the distribution of fi becomes more and more uniform, there is
almost no difierence between the populations generated by both types.
f (fi j a) »a (fi; p; w)¡ f (fi0 j a0) »a0 (fi0; p; w) =
[f (fi j a)¡ f (fi0 j a0)] »a (fi; p; w) ! 0
Example 2.3. Let A =
n
a 2 [0; 1]l = P ai = 1
o
and »a (p; w) be ob-
tained by the maximization of the utility function Ua = min faixig :
If ai > 0; for all i; then »ai (p; w) =
µ
w
ai
P
j
pj=aj
¶
: As previously, all the
types ai > 0 are part of the same equivalence class. The original type
that generates a given demand function is indistinguishable. However, if
ah = 0; for some h; then »ai6=h (p; w) =
µ
w
ai
P
j 6=h
pj=aj
¶
and the demand
for the h commodity(ies) is zero at any price. The equivalence class is
no more isomorphic to <l but to <l¡n where n is the number of com-
modities for which the demand is zero. It is obvious that those types
of consumers do have a characterisation invariant to the fi-transforms,
namely a zero-consumption of some goods.
The number of \signiflcant" types is
P
l¡1
k=0
Ck
l
= 2l ¡ 1 which is a fl-
nite number. As a result, the parametrization of the set of types by a
continuous parameter a is likely to over-represent some of the \signifl-
cant" types, in particular the equivalence class in which consumers have
a strictly positive demand for all goods.
As indicated by Grandmont in a private communication, in order to
derive precise results on the distribution of the demand functions in the
\overall"16 economy it would be interesting to study the dimension of the
equivalence classes and to introduce an adequate topology over the set of
\types" A. If the equivalence class of one type is reduced to one point17,
the corresponding demand function inherits a big weight in the total
distribution of demand functions. The demand functions that belong to
an equivalence class of higher dimension are to be considered with no
16
\overall" in the sense that the distribution of demand function is considered over
both types and ®-parameters.
17This is the case when the function is a Cobb-Douglas.
14
individual in°uence on the total outcome as in any atomless economy.
Furthermore, as already argued, the relative weights of some \types" in
the \overall" distribution can be biased by the parametrization of A. It
follows that the notion of \°atness" is (rather) ambiguous and is likely
to lead to very speciflc distributional assumptions.
To sum up, the di–culty in a parametric model of demand is that
heterogeneity of the parameter distribution has no a priori relationship
with heterogeneity of demand behaviour. The class of parametrizations
has to be restricted as pointed out in Kneip (1993). The transformation
introduced by J.-M. Grandmont is clearly such that, for a given type a;
when the density function of the parameter fi becomes °atter, hetero-
geneity of the demand function increases, as shown by I. Maret (1994).
However, the space of parameters and the space of demand functions are
not always topologically equivalent as their dimension difiers. This, to-
gether with the lack of \control" over the set of types A and the density
function „; explains that the latter property is not conserved by aggrega-
tion over the difierent \types" a. The heterogeneity of demand behaviour
in the whole economy does not always increase with the °atness of the
distribution of the parameters fi.
2.2.2. Minimum budget share
There is one assumption in Grandmont’s 92 paper that appears to bear
neither upon distributional aspects nor upon some fundamentals of the
model but in some sense rather on the (partial) result of aggregation.
This is Assumption 5 or \desiderability condition" that is, in my view,
rather a minimum budget share condition. In what follows it is argued
that this is a stronger assumption than it might seem to be.
From the economic point of view, Assumption 5 implies that there
is no saturation for any commodity. The fact that the budget share
is bounded away from zero for all vectors of prices means that all the
commodities in the economy are \essential". If all commodities are free
except one, whose price goes to inflnity, the expenditures devoted to this
commodity remains bounded from below by a strictly positive quantity.
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From a technical point of view, the assumption means that every single
price is a pole of degree one of the demand function and moreover that
the coe–cient of the pole (a function of the other prices) is to be bounded
away from zero.
The peculiarity of the functions that satisfy Assumption 5 is em-
phasized further by the extension of the demand functions that do not
verify it. One can establish that the assumption does not hold for any
demand function generated by the maximization of CES utility functions
(except the Cobb-Douglas). Neither does it hold for simple and presum-
ably \well behaved" demand functions like, say, the one generated by the
maximization of U (x1; x2) =
p
x1 + 4 + 2
p
x2: Note however that this
condition is not supposed to hold for every single function but for the
aggregate demand function.
Despite its peculiarity, Assumption 5 is necessary for Grandmont’s
result to hold. This will be shown in the next section.
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3. Variations on Scarf’s process
In what follows a generalisation of H. Scarf’s process (1960) is presented.
For the sake of comparability, the framework introduced by Grandmont
is used. It is shown that, for the proposed set of demand function (that
does not verify Assumption 5 about aggregate budget shares), gross-
substitutability of the excess demand is violated, whatever the \degree
of heterogeneity" in this exchange economy.
3.1. A simple example
The nowadays classic Scarf example is fltted into the Grandmont frame-
work. One knows the limits of such an example: sensitivity to the ini-
tial distribution of goods and violation of the desiderability assumption
(When the price for one good goes to zero, the corresponding demand
does not go toward inflnity). Those limits can easily be removed to the
cost of more intricate constructs that we attempt to avoid here. More-
over, we consider that the example still makes the point.
† Let A = [¡1; 1] and »a (p; w) be deflned as follows:
»a1 (p; w) =
a2 (a¡ 1)2wa
4 (p1 + p2)
+
a2 (a+ 1)2wa
4 (p3 + p1)
»a2 (p; w) =
a2 (a¡ 1)2wa
4 (p1 + p2)
+
[1¡ a2 (1 + a2) =2]wa
p2 + p3
»a3 (p; w) =
a2 (a+ 1)2wa
4 (p3 + p1)
+
[1¡ a2 (1 + a2) =2]wa
p2 + p3
It can be verifled that »a (p; w) is a demand function in the sense
of Grandmont:
Deflnition 3.1. A demand function » (p; w) is deflned for all vec-
tors of positive prices p 2 Int<l+ and all positive income w > 0;
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takes values in <l+; is homogeneous of degree 0 in (p; w) and satisfles
Walras’ Law, i.e., p:» (p; w) · w:
Note that »
¡1 (p; w), »0 (p; w) and »1 (p; w) might be obtained by the
maximization of the respective utility function U
¡1 = min fx1; x2g ;
U0 = min fx2; x3g ; U1 = min fx3; x1g : According to Example 2.3,
these three demand functions of the set A generate three distinct
two-dimensional equivalence classes by the fi-transform. The other
types still generate distinct equivalence classes that appear instead
to be isomorphic to <3:
† The income level that corresponds to type a is given by the formula
wa = p:ra where ra =
µ
a
2(a¡1)2
4
; 1¡ a
2(1+a2)
2
; a
2(a+1)2
4
¶
is the initial
endowment.
A distribution over types is given by the probability measure „ on
A. Let „ (¡1) = „ (0) = „ (1) = 1
3
; and „ (a) = 0 otherwise. Note
that we introduced a flnite number of (\signiflcant"18) types in the
economy that appear to generate isomorphic equivalence classes.
† Assumption 1 is verifled: The income level wa > 0 depends contin-
uously on the type a: Per capita income is flnite, i.e.,
„w =
Z
A
wa„ (da) =
X
a=f¡1;0;1g
wa„ (a) =
w¡1 + w0 + w1
3
< +1
then total market demand, given by
X (p) =
Z
A
X (a; p; wa)„ (da) =
X
a=f¡1;0;1g
X (a; p; wa)„ (a)
is well deflned, non-negative, continuous in p and satisfles p:X (p) ·
„w: Indeed
X (p) =
1
3
Ã
p1
p1 + p2
+
p3
p3 + p1
;
p2
p2 + p3
+
p1
p1 + p2
;
p3
p3 + p1
+
p2
p2 + p3
!
18
By \signi¯cant" types, it is meant that the equivalent classes generated by those
types exhibit speci¯c characteristics that make possible to retrieve the original type
that generated the demand curve. Moreover, because equivalence classes are not
reduced to one point, there is a proper aggregation on a population that is not reduced
to the initial set A:
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† Assumption 2 - (1) is satisfled: The demand function »a (p; w) is
continuous in (a; p; w) :
Assumption 2 - (2) is not necessary: We do not impose any as-
sumption on the continuity of the conditional density f (fi j a) ; on
the existence of its partial derivative (@f=@fik) (fi j a) and their con-
tinuity. Obviously, nothing prohibits this assumption from holding.
† Assumption 3 is not necessary: There is no assumption on the
\°atness" of the conditional density.
† Grandmont’s Assumption 4 is imposed: the conditional density
f (fi j a) is independent of a:
† Assumption 5 is not verifled. However, note that
ph
Z
A
»ah (p; wa)„ (da) > 0
for all p 2 Int<l
+
:
Proposition 3.1. For the set of types f»a (p; w) ; wag introduced, the
probability measure „ over A; and any unconditional density f (fi) ; the
aggregate excess demand function violates the gross substitutability as-
sumption.
Proof: In Appendix.
3.2. The continuous representation
One might think that previous result is due to the shift from a contin-
uous to a discrete representation of types. This is not the case. The
distribution over A was chosen because of the previous claim that dis-
tributional aspects should be checked carefully. Indeed, the distribution
over equivalence classes would be biased if the equivalence classes were
not of the same dimension or were over-represented. But the example
can easily be extended to the continuous framework:
Deflne the demand and the initial endowment as follows:
19
»a1 (p;w) »a2 (p;w)
¡1 · a · ¡1=2 wa
p1+p2
wa
p1+p2
¡1=2 · a · ¡1=4 ¡4
¡
a+ 1
4
¢
wa
p1+p2
¡4(a+ 1
4
)wa
p1+p2
+
[1+4(a+ 1
4
)]wa
p2+p3
¡1=4 · a · 1=4 0 wa
p2+p3
1=4 · a · 1=2
4(a¡ 1
4
)wa
p3+p1
[1¡4(a¡ 1
4
)]wa
p2+p3
1=2 · a · 1 wa
p3+p1
0
»a3 (p;w) (r1; r2; r3)a
¡1 · a · ¡1=2 0 (1; 0; 0)
¡1=2 · a · ¡1=4
[1+4(a+ 1
4
)]wa
p2+p3
(¡ (1 + 4a) ; 2 + 4a; 0)
¡1=4 · a · 1=4 wa
p2+p3
(0; 1; 0)
1=4 · a · 1=2
[1¡4(a¡ 14)]wa
p2+p3
+
4(a¡ 14)wa
p3+p1
(0; 2¡ 4a; 4a¡ 1)
1=2 · a · 1 wa
p3+p1
(0; 0; 1)
Proposition 3.2. For the set of types f»a (p; w) ; wag introduced, for
any probability measure „ with support included in
h
¡1;¡1
2
i
[
h
¡1
4
; 1
4
i
[
h
1
2
; 1
i
‰ A and such that R¡
1
2
¡1 „ (da) =
1
3
;
R 1
4
¡
1
4
„ (da) = 1
3
;
R
1
1
2
„ (da) = 1
3
and for any unconditional density f (fi) ; the aggregate demand function
violates the gross substitutability assumption.
Proof: It follows from the fact that
X (p) =
1
3
Ã
p1
p1 + p2
+
p3
p3 + p1
;
p2
p2 + p3
+
p1
p1 + p2
;
p3
p3 + p1
+
p2
p2 + p3
!
that is identical with previous example.
The (negative) results seem to be due to the very fact that As-
sumption 5 does not hold any more. Note however that the number of
efiective types (distinct equivalence classes) is still flnite.
3.3. The question of types
The impact (if there is one) of the number of types on the aggregate
demand function is not clear. Because the aggregation of a set (flnite
or inflnite) of demand functions derived from the maximization of Cobb-
Douglas utility functions can be obtained from the maximization of a
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Cobb-Douglas utility function, the number of efiective types has clearly
no importance for Grandmont’s theorem. The converse, i.e. whether
a set A that generates an inflnite number of equivalence classes might
exhibit \pathologies" when Assumption 5 is not verifled is still to be
established.
It has just been proved that without Assumption 5 and with a
flnite number of efiective types (and whatever the number of types in
the parametrization), there might be pathological cases. The following
example shows that this extends to the case in which there is an inflnite
number of equivalence classes. It is now based on the class of examples
given in the second part of the 1960 Scarf article. The demand is deflned
as follows for a flrst \class" of consumers19:
»
a1 (fi; p; w) =
bp
¡1=(1+a)
1 w
bp
a=(1+a)
1 + p
a=(1+a)
2
»a2 (fi; p; w) =
p
¡1=(1+a)
2 w
bp
a=(1+a)
1 + p
a=(1+a)
2
»a3 (fi; p; w) = 0
with b > a+1
a¡1
and a > 1: Again, one can verify that this is a demand
function in the sense of Grandmont. Now, all the types generate dis-
tinct equivalence classes: »a (fi; p; w) = »a0 (fi
0; p; w) (if ever it is possible)
would be obtained by a transformation that depends on prices.
This family of types is proved to violate gross substitutability in the
appendix.
Hence an inflnity of efiective types is not su–cient to restore Grand-
mont’s results.
19We de¯ne by permutation two other \class" of consumers.
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4. Grandmont’s Model Revisited
If heterogeneity is not su–cient a property to insure the gross-substituta-
bility in an exchange economy, the reader would certainly ask us to an-
swer two questions: What is the efiect of heterogeneity in Grandmont’s
Framework? Where does the nice result come from? Some hints are
provided in this section.
Arguably, as the distribution over fi spreads, the relative weight
in the aggregate demand of the \non-asymptotic" values must decrease.
Heuristically, if the conditional densities are \°at" enough, one can un-
derstand that the aggregate demand behaves in a similar manner to the
fi-transformed functions when fi is \big" in absolute value.
Let us consider a demand function that verifles Assumption 5. The de-
mand curve is bounded from below by the surface ("h „w=ph)h=1::l : It is
bounded from above by the budget constraint
P
h ph
R
A
»ah (p; wa)„ (da) •
„w, thus by ( „w=ph)h=1::l : The general idea is that if such inequalities hold
for all vectors of positive prices, the demand functions are \likely" to
be \similar to" Cobb-Douglas functions for \asymptotic"20 values of the
prices. With a flxed price, but with asymptotic values of the parameter
fi; the fi-transform of the demand should behave in the same manner21;
While \heterogeneity" increases, everything should happen as if more and
more \Cobb-Douglas like" demand functions were added to the economy.
The precise meaning of these ideas is given in what follows while a
formal proof is provided in the appendix. The following example clearly
illustrates how this works.22
Consider the transformation T deflned as follows:
e®1 = ‰ cos µ
e®2 = ‰ sin µ
where (fi1; fi2) 2 <2 and (‰; µ) 2 <+ £ [0; …=2] :
20more precisely ph ! 0
+ and ph ! +1:
21 lim
®!¡1
phe
®h
! 0+; lim
®!+1
phe
®h
! +1
22I'm grateful to Kurt Hildenbrand who gave me this illuminating example.
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Figure 4.1: A Transformation in the Parameter Space.
The generating demand function »a (p;w) of the equivalent class a is
represented by a circle O in both ¯gures. This is to be found for (®1; ®2)
= (0; 0) thus at the origin in Grandmont's space and for (½; µ) =¡p
2; ¼=4
¢
or at the point (1; 1) in the new space. The bold line represents
all the points such that the ratio of the stretching coe±cients k (µ) =
e®2=e®1 = tan µ is a constant.
The calculation of the demand can be obtained using following
formulae:
Xa (p) =
Z
<2
»a (fi; p) f (fi) dfi
= 2
Z ¼=2
0
"Z +1
0
»a (‰; µ; p) f (‰; µ)
d‰
‰
#
dµ
sin µ cos µ
In what follows, we will study the proflle in the new parameter space of
the density function
g (‰; µ) =
2
‰ sin µ cos µ
f (‰; µ)
in the case where heterogeneity increases in the sense of Grandmont,
namely when f (fi) is more and more \°at".
Deflne I (µ) as the weight given to the functions with a given
\stretching ratio" k (µ) = e®2=e®1 :
I (µ) =
2
sin µ cos µ
"Z +1
0
f (‰; µ)
d‰
‰
#
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For the \standard" density function
fN (fi) =
exp
³
¡®21+®22
N2
´
2…N2
one gets
mN (i) =
Z
<2
¯¯
¯¯
¯
@f (fi)
@fii
¯¯
¯¯
¯ dfi =
1p
…N
IN (µ) =
exp
³
¡ ln2(tan µ)
2N2
´
p
2…N sin µ cos µ
Consider now the weight W´;N given to the interval A´ =
h
·; ¼
2
¡ ·
i
:
Figure 4.2: Density I (µ)
W´;N =
Z ¼
2
¡´
´
2e¡
ln2(tan µ)
2N2p
2…N sin µ cos µ
dµ =
1p
…
Z ln(tan(¼2¡´))p
2N
ln(tan ´)p
2N
e¡v
2
dv
One can verify that IN (µ) is a density function as lim´!0+W´;N = 1; any
N: However, for any · > 0; limN!+1W´;N = 0: As a result, when the
density f (fi) becomes more and more \°at" in the sense of Grandmont,
the economy is almost only made up of functions »a (fi; p) such that µ
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is \outside" A´: This means that e
®1=e®2 or e®2=e®1 is very low. This
property, that can be generalised for any density function f (fi) and in
any dimension l ‚ 2 leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 4.1. For any · > 0; deflne the set of parameters A´ as
follows:
A´ = ffi : jfii ¡ fij 6=ij • ln (1=·) ; all ig :
For any smooth density f (fi) over vectors fi in <l; let us deflne the
density f¾ (fi) =
1
¾
f
³
®
¾
´
: This density is associated with the \coe–cient
of °atness" m (f¾) = supk=1::l mk (f¾) with
mk (f¾) =
Z
<l
¯¯¯
¯¯ 1
¾
@f
@fik
µ
fi
¾
¶¯¯¯
¯¯ dfi = 1
¾
Z
<l
¯¯¯
¯¯ @f
@fik
(fi)
¯¯¯
¯¯ dfi = 1
¾
mk (f) :
For any ·; " > 0 there exists a real ¾´;" such that for any ¾ > ¾´;"; the
density f¾ (fi) =
1
¾
f
³
®
¾
´
gives a weight to the set A´ that is lower than
": Formally
8" > 0; 9 ¾´;" 2 <¤+ j 8¾ > ¾´;";
Z
A´
f¾ (fi) dfi < ":
As a result, when the \°atness" of f (fi) increases, the whole weight
is given to the functions »a (fi; p) such that jfii ¡ fij 6=ij goes to infln-
ity (hence with a very large or an arbitrarily small \stretching ratio"
e®j 6=i=e®i). Heuristically, when fii goes tominus inflnity, there is a stretch-
ing of the map »a (p; w) in the direction of pi and the behaviour of the
fi-transformed function is the asymptotic behaviour of the generating
function when pi goes to zero. Conversely, when fii goes to plus inflnity,
the map is compressed and the behaviour of the fi-transformed function
is the asymptotic behaviour of the generating function when pi goes to
inflnity. In what follows, we will attempt to further specify this in order
to outline the proflle of these demand functions.
Consider the special case where the generating demand function is
a C.E.S. The fi-transformed function is given by the following formula
»a1 (fi; p) =
a¾e®1(1¡¾)p¡¾1 w
a¾e®1(1¡¾)p1¡¾1 + (1¡ a)¾ e®2(1¡¾)p1¡¾2
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Figure 4.3: Impact of fi when fii goes to inflnity
»a2 (fi; p) =
(1¡ a)¾ e®2(1¡¾)p¡¾2 w
a¾e®1(1¡¾)p1¡¾1 + (1¡ a)¾ e®2(1¡¾)p1¡¾2
Thus when jfi2 ¡ fi1j ! +1; the function »a (fi; p) is, in the limit, either
(»a1; »a2) (p) =
³
w
p1
; 0
´
or (»a1; »a2) (p) =
³
0; w
p2
´
; namely two degenerated
Cobb-Douglas. Remember that it was shown by Grandmont that these
functions are the only ones that are invariant under fi-transformation.
Thus a Cobb-Douglas is like an atom in the economy generated by fi-
transformation. As the distribution of parameter fi becomes \°atter",
the number of \Cobb-Douglas like" demand functions increases and their
behaviour dominates. This explains the nice behaviour of the aggregate.
More generally, two cases may arise. The expenditure functions
wah = ph»ah (p; w) are bounded from above by w and from below by
zero. However the market shares do not always have a limit when ph
goes to inflnity (and/or when ph goes to zero). If there is a limit, like
for the CES, the fi-transformed function is reduced, in the limit, to a
(possibly degenerated) Cobb-Douglas.
If the expenditure functions do not have a limit when the prices go to
inflnity (and/or when ph goes to zero), then the market shares of the
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Figure 4.4: Impact of fi when fii goes to minus inflnity
fi-transformed functions endlessly \°uctuate". Formally
9 · > 0 j 8fi; p 2 <l; 9p0 > p 2 <l j
jwah (fi; p; w)¡ wah (fi; p; w)j > ·
Heuristically, these \°uctuating functions" are only likely to make a min-
imal contribution to the aggregate. Firstly, because the aggregation over
the equivalent classes is likely to cancel out these variations and pro-
duce a smoother mean. Secondly, since the Cobb-Douglas are the only
invariant of the fi-transformation, the latter are more likely to impose
their behaviour on the aggregate (provided there are some in the econ-
omy). Moreover, one might ask whether it is \reasonable" to consider a
demand function such that the expenditures \°uctuate" when the prices
go toward inflnity (or toward zero).
As mentioned by Grandmont, assumption 5 insures a non-vanishing
aggregate demand, i.e. the presence of at least one non-degenerated
Cobb-Douglas demand function in the limit. It is not quite clear whether
this assumption could play another role in obtaining this result. One
will observe that the diagonal dominance of the jacobian matrix of the
demand can be derived from the small size of the coe–cients of the
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expenditure elasticity matrix:
@ log »h (fi; p)
@ log pk
+ –hk =
pk
»h (fi; p)
@»h (fi; p)
@pk
+
pk
ph
@ph
@pk
=
pk
wh
@wh (fi; p)
@pk
As a result, if »a (p) verifles assumption 5, the very fact that @wh=@pk
is \small" su–cies in order for any single function to be able to vali-
date Grandmont’s theorem. Nevertheless, it was not possible for us to
derive general properties for the functions »h (fi; p): Even the additional
assumption that wh (p) has a limit is not su–cient in order to be able to
add further restrictions to the behaviour of its derivative @wh=@pk hence
for the theorem to be verifled by every single function.
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5. Conclusion
The transformation introduced by Grandmont is likely to over-represent
some speciflc demand functions in the overall distribution. Assumption 5
that guarantees aggregate budget shares to be uniformly bounded away
from zero appears to be quite restrictive. However this assumption is nec-
essary for Grandmont’s theorem to hold: \Generic" heterogeneity does
not su–ce in order to guarantee nice aggregate properties. This suggests
that it is not the \°atness" assumption per se that produces Grandmont’s
results but rather the conjunction of this assumption together with the
speciflc form of the demand functions.
The economic interpretation of Assumption 5 is that all commodities in
the economy are \essential". In the present setup, its (technical) underly-
ing consequence is the fact that, when the distribution of parameter fi is
\°at enough", there is a \large" number of demand functions in the over-
all population whose behaviour is \close to" the Cobb-Douglas demand.
In the limit, and if \pathological" cases are excluded, the distribution of
demand functions in the economy is reduced to a Cobb-Douglas. It is
another matter, whether or not the underlying assumption ensuring this
result is realistic.
In order to relax Assumption 5, that bears upon the (partial) result
of aggregation, and to correct the bias induced by the parametrization, it
would be in the logic of the distributional approach to investigate whether
some properties can be derived from assumptions on both densities, over
the set A of types and over the set of parameters fi. This would require (i)
a comprehensive topology to be introduced for the space of equivalence
classes, and (ii) speciflc properties to be established for the correspond-
ing demand functions. One should note that this is an attempt to restore
regularity on the basis of a model which takes no account of the direct
interaction between individuals. Distributional assumptions provide an
alternative route to restoring \good" aggregate behaviour. Taking ac-
count of direct interaction may provide another. The problem with the
distributional approach adopted here is that it is based on assumptions
about characteristics of agents, which unlike income for example, cannot
29
be observed. Thus the heterogeneity necessary to establish such results
cannot be empirically tested. In any event, one has to re°ect on the
merits of such an approach. Clearly, one might be more confortable with
a theory which can generate empirically testable propositions.
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7. Appendix
7.1. Violation of gross substitutability
The justiflcation for reversing the order of the sign
R
and the linear
operators
P
and @
@pi
is to be found in the dominated convergence theorem.
From Assumption 1,
X (a; p; w) =
Z
<3
»a (fi; p; w) f (fi) dfi
Thus
zh (p) =
X
a=f¡1;0;1g
Z
<3
(»ah (fi; p; p:r)¡ rah) f (fi) dfi
=
Z
<3
X
a=f¡1;0;1g
(»ah (fi; p; p:r)¡ rah) f (fi) dfi
The excess demand function for commodity 1 is:
z1 (p) =
1
3
Z
<3
Ã
p1e
¡®1
p1e¡®1 + p2e¡®2
+
p3e
¡®1
p3e¡®3 + p1e¡®1
¡ 1
!
f (fi) dfi
=
1
3
Z
<3
Ã
p3e
¡®1
p3e¡®3 + p1e¡®1
¡ p2e
¡®2
p1e¡®1 + p2e¡®2
!
f (fi) dfi
Thus
@z1 (p)
@p2
=
1
3
@
@p2
Z
<3
Ã
p3e
¡®1
p3e¡®3 + p1e¡®1
¡ p2e
¡®2
p1e¡®1 + p2e¡®2
!
f (fi) dfi
=
1
3
Z
<3
@
@p2
Ã
p3e
¡®1
p3e¡®3 + p1e¡®1
¡ p2e
¡®2
p1e¡®1 + p2e¡®2
!
f (fi) dfi
=
¡1
3
Z
<3
p1e
¡®1¡®2
(p1e¡®1 + p2e¡®2)
2
f (fi) dfi < 0
and gross substitutability is violated, any p:
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7.2. With an inflnity of types
The demand function for an individual belonging to the flrst category of
types is:
»a1 (fi; p; w) =
bp
¡1=(1+a)
1 w
bp
a=(1+a)
1 + p
a=(1+a)
2
»a2 (fi; p; w) =
p
¡1=(1+a)
2 w
bp
a=(1+a)
1 + p
a=(1+a)
2
»a3 (fi; p; w) = 0
with b > a+1
a¡1
and a > 1: The demand for the two other categories of
types is obtained by permutating the role of the three commodities.
The fi-transform of the flrst category of types is given by the formula:
»a1 (p; w) =
be¡®1a=(1+a)p
¡1=(1+a)
1 w
be¡®1a=(1+a)p
a=(1+a)
1 + e
¡®2a=(1+a)p
a=(1+a)
2
»a2 (p; w) =
e¡®2a=(1+a)p
¡1=(1+a)
2 w
be¡®1a=(1+a)p
a=(1+a)
1 + e
¡®2a=(1+a)p
a=(1+a)
2
»a3 (p; w) = 0
The demand for the flrst good over the three categories of types
and given the parameter a is
x1 (a; fi; p; w) =
be
¡a®1
1+a p
a
1+a
1
be
¡a®1
1+a p
a=(1+a)
1 +e
¡a®2
1+a p
a=(1+a)
2
+
e
¡a®1
1+a p
¡1=(1+a)
1 p3
be
¡a®3
1+a p
a=(1+a)
3 +e
¡a®1
1+a p
a=(1+a)
1
The excess demand function for commodity 1 is:
z1 (p) =
Z
A
µZ
<3
(x1 (a; fi; p; w)¡ 1) f (fi) dfi
¶
„ (a) da
where
@
@p2
((x1 (a; fi; p; w)¡ 1))
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=
@
@p2
0
B@ be
¡a®1
1+a p
a
1+a
1
be
¡a®1
1+a p
a
1+a
1 + e
¡a®2
1+a p
a
1+a
2
+
e
®1
1+a e¡®3p
¡1
1+a
1 p3
be
¡a®3
1+a p
a
1+a
3 + e
¡a®1
1+a p
a
1+a
1
¡ 1
1
CA
=
¡ a
1+a
be
¡a®1
1+a e
¡a®2
1+a p
a
1+a
1 p
¡1
1+a
2³
be¡a
®1
1+ap1 + e
¡a
®2
1+ap2
´2
Thus
@z1 (p)
@p2
=
@
@p2
Z
A
µZ
<3
z1 (a; fi; p; w) f (fi) dfi
¶
„ (a) da < 0
and gross substitutability is violated.
7.3. Density function in the transformed space
7.3.1. The example
The density function is:
fN (fi) =
exp
³
¡®21+®22
N2
´
2…N2
=
exp
³
¡ 1
N2
³
(ln (‰ cos µ))2 + (ln (‰ sin µ))2
´´
2…N2
=
exp
³
¡ 1
2N2
³
ln2 (‰2 sin µ cos µ) + ln2 (tan µ)
´´
2…N2
= fN (‰; µ)
The weight given to the functions with a \stretching ratio" k (µ) is:
I (µ) =
1
sin µ cos µ
lim
A!0+
B!+1
Z
B
A
2
‰
fN (‰; µ) d‰
=
1
2…N2
exp
³
¡ ln2(tan µ)
2N2
´
sin µ cos µ
lim
A!0+
B!+1
Z
B
A
2
‰
exp
Ã
¡ ln
2 (‰2 sin µ cos µ)
2N2
!
d‰
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=
1p
2…N
exp
³
¡ ln2(tan µ)
2N2
´
sin µ cos µ
lim
A!0+
B!+1
Z ln(B2 sin µ cos µ)=p2N
ln(A2 sin µ cos µ)=
p
2N
e¡u
2
du
=
exp
³
¡ ln2(tan µ)
2N2
´
p
2…N sin µ cos µ
By imposing v = ln(tan µ)p
2N
; one can verify that I (µ) is a density
function on [0; …=2] :
Z ¼=2
0
2e¡
ln2(tan µ)
2N2p
2…N sin µ cos µ
dµ =
1p
…
Z
+1
¡1
e¡v
2
dv = 1
However, the weight of the set A´ =
h
·; ¼
2
¡ ·
i
is
W´;N =
Z ¼
2
¡´
´
2e¡
ln2(tan µ)
2N2p
2…N sin µ cos µ
dµ =
1p
…
Z ln(tan(¼2¡´))p
2N
ln(tan ´)p
2N
e¡v
2
dv
and
lim
N!+1
W´;N =
1p
…
lim
N!+1
Z ln(tan(¼2¡´))p
2N
ln(tan ´)p
2N
e¡v
2
dv = 0
7.3.2. General Case
For any · > 0; deflne the set of parameters A´ as follows:
A´ = ffi : jfii ¡ fij 6=ij • ln (1=·) ; all ig
For any smooth density f (fi) over vectors fi in <l; deflne the density
f¾ (fi) =
1
¾
f
³
®
¾
´
: This density is associated with the \coe–cient of °at-
ness" m (f¾) = supk=1::l mk (f¾) with
mk (f¾) =
Z
<l
¯¯
¯¯¯ 1
¾
@f
@fik
µ
fi
¾
¶¯¯¯¯¯ dfi = 1
¾
Z
<l
¯¯
¯¯¯ @f
@fik
(fi)
¯¯
¯¯¯ dfi = 1
¾
mk (f)
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In dimension one We will proof that f (x) • m=2 :
Z
<
¯¯
¯¯
¯
@f
@fi
(fi)
¯¯
¯¯
¯ dfi < +1 ) 8" > 0;9A j
Z
+1
A
¯¯
¯¯
¯
@f
@fik
(fi)
¯¯
¯¯
¯ dfi < "
hence
8x; y ‚ A; jf (y)¡ f (x)j •
Z y
x
¯¯
¯¯
¯
@f
@fik
(fi)
¯¯
¯¯
¯ dfi •
Z
+1
A
¯¯
¯¯
¯
@f
@fik
(fi)
¯¯
¯¯
¯ dfi < ":
and f (fi) has a limit in +1: Because R
<
f (fi) dfi < +1; this limit is
zero. Idem in ¡1:
Finally
m =
Z
+1
¡1
¯¯
¯¯
¯
@f
@fi
(fi)
¯¯
¯¯
¯ dfi =
Z x
¡1
¯¯
¯¯
¯
@f
@fi
(fi)
¯¯
¯¯
¯ dfi+
Z
+1
x
¯¯
¯¯
¯
@f
@fi
(fi)
¯¯
¯¯
¯ dfi
‚
¯¯
¯¯
¯
Z x
¡1
@f
@fi
(fi) dfi
¯¯
¯¯
¯+
¯¯
¯¯
¯
Z
+1
x
@f
@fi
(fi)
¯¯
¯¯
¯ dfi = 2 jf (x)j
and the integral over a compact of a function that goes uniformly to zero
goes itself to zero. Formally if A´ = ffi : jfij • ln (1=·)g
8·; " > 0;9¾´;" 2 <¤+ j 8¾ > ¾´;";
Z
A´
f¾ (fi) dfi • m
2¾
< "
In dimension l > 1 Without any loss of generality, assume k 6= 1:
Deflne the transformation T kn that substitutes µk = arctan (e
®k=e®1) to
fik and let the other parameters unchanged. The Jacobi of the trans-
formation is (sin µk cos µk)
¡1. The computation of the demand is to be
obtained according to the following formula:
Xa (p) =
Z
<l
»a (fi; p) f (fi) dfi
=
Z µk=¼=2
µk=0
"Z
®i 6=k2<
»a (fii6=k; µk; p) f (fii6=k; µk; p) dfii6=k
#
dµk
sin µk cos µk
In what follows, we will study the proflle of the density function
I (µk) =
1
sin µk cos µk
"Z
®i 6=k2<
f (fii6=k; µk; p) dfii6=k
#
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By assumption, Z ¼
2
0
I (µk) dµk = 1
However
f (fi) = jf (fi)j =
¯¯
¯¯
¯
Z
®k
0
@f
@fik
(fi1; :::; fik¡1; uk; fik+1; ::fil) duk
¯¯
¯¯
¯
•
Z
®k
0
¯¯
¯¯
¯
@f
@fik
(fi1; :::; fik¡1; uk; fik+1; ::fil)
¯¯
¯¯
¯ duk
Thus
Z
®i 6=k2<
f (fi) dfii •
Z
®i6=k2<
Z
®k
0
¯¯
¯¯
¯
@f
@fik
(fi1; :::; fik¡1; uk; fik+1; ::fil)
¯¯
¯¯
¯ dukdfii
•
Z
<l
¯¯
¯¯
¯
@f
@fik
(fi)
¯¯
¯¯
¯ dfi = mk < +1
and flnally
Z
A´
f¾ (fi) dfi •
Z arctan(1=´)
arctan ´
·Z
<l¡1
f¾ (fi) dfi
¸
dµk
sin µk cos µk
• mk
¾
Z arctan(1=´)
arctan ´
dµk
sin µk cos µk
• mk
¾
ln
³
1=·2
´
For any ·; " > 0 there exist a real ¾´;" such that for any ¾ > ¾´;"; the
density f¾ (fi) =
1
¾
f
³
®
¾
´
gives a weight to the set A´ that is lower than
": Formally
8" > 0;9¾´;" 2 <¤+ j 8¾ > ¾´;";
Z
A´
f¾ (fi) dfi < "
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